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Abstract
Psychiatric nosology is widely criticized, but solutions are proving elusive. Planned revisions of diagnostic criteria
will not resolve heterogeneity, comorbidity, fuzzy boundaries between normal and pathological, and lack of
specific biomarkers. Concern about these difficulties reflects a narrow model that assumes most mental disorders
should be defined by their etiologies. A more genuinely medical model uses understanding of normal function to
categorize pathologies. For instance, understanding the function of a cough guides the search for problems
causing it, and decisions about when it is expressed abnormally. Understanding the functions of emotions is a
foundation missing from decisions about emotional disorders. The broader medical model used by the rest of
medicine also recognizes syndromes defined by failures of functional systems or failures of feedback control. Such
medical syndromes are similar to many mental diagnoses in their multiple causes, blurry boundaries, and
nonspecific biomarkers. Dissatisfaction with psychiatric nosology may best be alleviated, not by new diagnostic
criteria and categories, but by more realistic acknowledgment of the untidy landscape of mental and other
medical disorders.
Background
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders (DSM) [1] is the object of unrelenting criticism
[2-7]. The first page of a leading psychiatry textbook
says, “there is little reason to believe that these cate-
gories are valid” [8]. Clinicians say DSM categories
ignore important aspects of many patients’ problems.
Teachers report that reification of diagnoses leads stu-
dents to neglect important phenomenology [8,9].
Researchers protest requirements to use DSM categories
that do not map well to neuroscience hypotheses [10].
Non-professionals are skeptical about disorders defined
by committees. And, physicians in other areas of medi-
cine cannot help but wonder why psychiatric diagnosis
is so problematic.
The current crisis in psychiatric nosology originated in
the solution to a previous crisis. In the early 1970s, psy-
chiatry awoke from a long dream to find itself floating
on a couch in the backwaters of medicine. A wake-up
call came when a 1973 article in Science reported that
12 “pseudopatients,” who pretended to hear hallucina-
tions, were hospitalized and received a diagnosis of schi-
zophrenia, even though they acted normal after
admission [11]. More positive calls came from psychia-
trists reporting remarkably selective responses to new
medications [12], from researchers identifying genetic
influences [13], and from new proposals for diagnostic
criteria [14].
By the late 1970s, psychiatry was eager to establish its
scientific credibility, and the unreliability of psychiatric
diagnosis was an obvious problem. For instance, the
DSM-II definition for Depressive Neurosis was: “an
excessive reaction of depression due to an internal con-
flict or to an identifiable event such as the loss of a love
object or cherished possession” [15]. Is depression after
loss of a favorite cat “excessive?” One diagnostician
would say, “Yes,” another, “Obviously not!” Such
unreliability made research impossible, and psychiatry’s
scientific aspirations laughable.
The solution was the DSM-III [16]. Published in 1980,
it jettisoned psychoanalytic theory, and replaced clinical
impressions with checklists of operationalized indicators.
The DSM-III criteria for major depression required the
presence of at least five of nine possible symptoms for a
duration of at least two weeks. The details changed
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slightly in the 1994 DSM-IV, (adding criteria requiring
clinically significant distress or impairment), but these
revisions did not change the core strategy of using
checklists of criteria to define diagnostic categories [17].
Operationalized diagnosis transformed psychiatry [18].
It made possible standardized interviews epidemiologists
could use to measure the prevalence of specific disor-
ders [19]. Neurobiologists could search for pathology
specific to reliably defined conditions. Clinical research-
ers at multiple sites could collaborate on treatment stu-
dies that produced massive datasets, now summarized in
treatment guidelines. Regulatory agencies, insurance
companies and funding agencies could, and soon did,
require DSM diagnoses. Psychiatrists could finally diag-
nose and treat specific disorders, just like other physi-
cians. The solution to the crisis of the 1970s has, in
many respects, succeeded beyond all expectations.
Problems
Operationalizing diagnosis also revealed major problems.
We use the word “revealed” because many problems
associated with the revised DSM systems were not
caused by it, but were revealed by studies it made possi-
ble. Comorbidity was found to be prevalent; most indivi-
duals who have one disorder also qualify for additional
diagnoses [20,21]. Heterogeneity of patients within diag-
nostic groups is substantial; for instance, two individuals
with no specific symptom in common may both qualify
for the diagnosis of major depression. Boundaries separ-
ating individuals with and without a disorder appear
arbitrary, and they are often not separated by a “zone of
rarity” [22]. Finally, with the exception of neurological
disorders such as Huntington’s Disease, not one of the
main DSM mental disorders can be validated by labora-
tory or imaging biomarkers.
Checklist systems also have been said to encourage
superficial evaluations that focus on DSM criteria to the
exclusion of other phenomenology and attempts to
understand the origins of an individual’s problems
[9,23]. The introduction to the DSM-IV includes a dis-
claimer: “In DSM-IV, there is no assumption that each
category of mental disorder is a completely discrete
entity with absolute boundaries dividing it from other
mental disorders or from no mental disorder. There is
also no assumption that all people described as having
the same mental disorder are alike in all important
ways” [24]. However, “cautionary statements within the
DSM-IV, if read at all, provide little protection among
many communities of users against reification of the
disorders listed within [3] p 158.” The use of categories
based on operationalized criteria encourages thinking
about diagnoses as if they are discrete diseases - “essen-
tialized natural kinds” in philosophy’s lingo [25,26].
Such reification of diagnoses discourages attempts to
understand how multiple factors interact over time to
cause a range of unfolding cognitions and emotions in
any particular individual [26].
Many medical disorders are defined by a specific etiol-
ogy, or by distinctive anatomical or molecular abnormal-
ities. Despite exhaustive searches, no comparable
objective indicators have been found for any major men-
tal disorder [27]. Some statistically significant neurobio-
logical differences characterize certain diagnostic groups
(for example, on brain imaging), but they are neither
specific nor sensitive enough to validate any diagnosis.
The chair of the DSM-IV Task Force, Allen Frances,
notes “the disappointing fact is that not even one biolo-
gical test is ready for inclusion in the criteria sets for
DSM-V” [28]
Proposed solutions
Several solutions have been considered: revising the cri-
teria, radically reformulating them, using biomarkers to
define new categories, and creating new categories based
on brain circuits or functions.
DSM criteria are being revised by a 29 member Task
Force, which coordinates the work of 6 Study Groups
and 13 Work Groups [29]. Their product, the DSM-5,
scheduled for publication in 2013, will likely incorporate
changes, such as including all psychiatric and other per-
sonality disorders on a single Axis, and specifying levels
of impairment for personality functioning. It may also
combine some categories (for example, substance
dependence and substance abuse into substance use dis-
order) and split others (for example, agoraphobia may
become a diagnosis separate from panic disorder). How-
ever, the core approach will remain the same: operatio-
nalized criteria will define categories that are neither
framed by a theoretical understanding of normal func-
tion nor validated by objective biomarkers. Few believe
the DSM-5 will satisfy the critics of the DSM-IV.
Larger changes have been considered. For instance,
committees have considered adding a quantitative
dimension to measure the severity of diagnoses objec-
tively, without reference to a “clinical significance” cri-
terion [30,31]. They also considered basing diagnoses on
a patient’s similarity to prototype diagnoses [32,33].
Most experts have concluded that such major changes
would cause confusion and decrease diagnostic consis-
tency, with disadvantages that would outweigh benefits
[3,34,35].
Another possible solution is to push harder to find
biomarkers that define disorders. This is the main cur-
rent strategy, as reflected by many articles [10,36,37],
and the title of the first chapter of the previously men-
tioned psychiatry textbook: “Introduction and considera-
tions for a brain-based diagnostic system in psychiatry”
[8]. This approach will eventually succeed for some
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disorders, but three decades of consistently negative
results suggest it is time to step back and ask why we
cannot find diagnostic biomarkers, and what alternative
approaches are available.
Some neuroscientists suggest that better categories
may come from studying “brain circuits” [2]. This
reflects growing recognition that disorders do not neces-
sarily correspond to pathology in specific brain regions
or neurochemicals, and that functions are carried out by
pathways that connect diverse loci. This approach justi-
fiably highlights adaptive functions; however, it
encourages a potentially misleading analogy of evolved
brain systems with human-designed circuits. Circuits
designed by engineers have discrete modules with speci-
fic functions and defined connections that are all neces-
sary for normal operation. Evolved information
processing systems have components with indistinct
boundaries, distributed functions, massive redundancy,
and innumerable connections that comprise systems
very different from anything that an engineer, or a neu-
roscientist, could even describe exactly [33,38]. These
factors may help to explain why neuroimaging, like
other putative biomarkers, has relatively low sensitivity/
specificity for psychiatric diagnostic categories.
A related initiative proposes Research Domain Criteria
(RDoC), with five domains (negative valence systems,
positive valence systems, cognitive systems, systems for
social processes and arousal/regulatory systems) that
intersect with seven units of analysis (genes, molecules,
cells, circuits, laboratory findings, behavior and self-
reports) [36]. The hope is that RDoC will help identify
abnormalities that characterize mental disorders. For
instance, RDoC might encourage investigators to group
together individuals with heightened amygdala respon-
siveness, regardless of their diagnoses. This approach
has the virtue of trying to understand pathology in a fra-
mework based on normal functions, but it remains com-
mitted to the hope that most psychiatric diagnoses will
eventually be based on biomarkers.
A fundamentally different approach to improved diag-
nosis has come from evolutionary perspectives. Wake-
field’s definition of mental disorders as “harmful
dysfunctions” has spurred important recognition of the
need to consider abnormal functions of evolved systems
in the context of social values [39]. Other philosophi-
cally and biologically sophisticated articles also propose
approaches to diagnosis based on an evolutionary
understanding of adaptive functions [40,41]. These ideas
provide a valuable connection to the kind of functional
thinking that physiology offers to the rest of medicine.
Learning from the rest of medicine
Reducing concerns about nosology for mental disorders
to the level typical for diagnosis in the rest of medicine
would be a great advance. Psychiatry has emulated the
rest of medicine by seeking causes and categories in bio-
logical mechanisms, but because it lacks the kind of
functional framework that physiology often provides for
the rest of medicine, there is a temptation to conceptua-
lize disorders in an essentialist way that oversimplifies
reality. Thus, psychiatry’s diagnostic categories have
been based on mixtures of tradition, clinical experience
and brute empiricism. Despite cautions that such cate-
gories must be tentative, they are inevitably reified.
Emotions are adaptive responses
Physicians in other medical specialties routinely distin-
guish direct manifestations of bodily malfunction from
symptoms that are normal protective responses. Sei-
zures, paralysis and dyskinesias arise from abnormal
bodily mechanisms. Cough, pain and fever, by contrast,
are normal protective responses shaped by natural selec-
tion in conjunction with regulation systems that express
them in situations where their benefits are likely to
exceed their costs [42,43]. Cough clears foreign material
from respiratory passages; patients who cannot cough
are likely to die from pneumonia. Pain is useful when
tissue is being damaged; patients with congenital
absence of pain usually die young. Treatment to relieve
cough or pain is prescribed only after investigating what
is causing them.
Capacities for anxiety and mood also exist because
they offered selective advantages to our ancestors
[44-47]. Emotions adjust diverse aspects of physiology,
cognition, behavior and motivation in ways that
increased ability to cope with situations that influenced
fitness during our evolutionary history [48]. Their utility
is confirmed by the existence of systems that regulate
their expression; such systems could evolve only if the
responses were useful in certain circumstances. It is also
confirmed by the complications that can arise from
blocking normal defenses, such as fast progression of
pneumonia after excessive cough suppression.
If defensive responses are normal and useful, how can
medications that block them ever be safe? Apparently
excessive defense expression can often be explained by
the “smoke detector principle.” False alarms are com-
mon and expected because the costs of expressing a
defense is often small compared to the potentially huge
costs of failing to respond adequately to a real danger
[42]. This principle and redundant protective systems
explain why is it often safe to use medications to block
normal pain, fever, cough and anxiety.
Defense regulation systems can fail, giving rise to
responses that are abnormal in any circumstance. Most
defensive responses are aversive, so their inappropriate
arousal causes much suffering. High prevalence rates for
chronic pain, chronic fatigue, anxiety disorders and
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depression suggest that the regulation mechanisms
underlying cognitive/emotional symptoms are especially
vulnerable to failure [42]. Most such failures are not
complete but involve responses that are too soon, too
strong or too prolonged for the situation. Other failures,
such as in bipolar disorder, reflect more fundamental
control system abnormalities that can result in oscilla-
tions that sometimes leave the system stuck at an
extreme.
Recognition that emotions are adaptive responses akin
to pain and cough has implications for assessment and
treatment. Determining if an emotional response is nor-
mal or pathological requires knowledge about whether
the situations or internal motivational structures that
normally arouse the emotion are present [7,49]. While
some conditions, such as recurrent severe major depres-
sion, are clearly abnormal, diagnosing an expression of
emotion as abnormal without considering the life con-
text is like diagnosing chronic pain without looking for
possible causes of tissue damage.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to differentiate normal
emotions from those expressed inappropriately. A long
tradition of trying to distinguish endogenous from exo-
genous depression has mostly been abandoned because
it is hard to do reliably, and because their symptoms
and treatment responses are similar.
Even the most prototypically understandable exogen-
ous depression - bereavement - is the focus of current
debate. With the exception of atypical or extreme symp-
toms, DSM-IV criteria exclude a diagnosis of major
depression in the two months after loss of a loved one
because depression symptoms are normal in that period.
Wakefield and colleagues have suggested expanding
exclusion criteria to other extreme situations in order to
avoid misdiagnosing normal sadness as pathological
depression [50], and they note that narrowing the DSM-
IV exclusion criteria actually reduced diagnostic validity
[51]. Kendler and others suggest eliminating the grief
criterion. They note that the International Classification
for Diseases has never had a grief exclusion, that depres-
sion arising from bereavement is not clinically distinct
from other depression, that having a single exclusion is
logically inconsistent, and that expanding exclusions to
other situations would cause confusion and decrease
reliability [52,53].
Eliminating the grief exclusion would increase consis-
tency and reliability, but at a cost not only to validity,
but also to common sense; bereavement is not a mental
disorder. Extending the exclusion to other situations
would make the diagnosis of emotional disorders more
like that in the rest of medicine, where normal
responses are distinguished from the problems that
arouse them, and where detailed information about
function and context is used to consider the possibility
that the symptom might arise from an abnormal regula-
tion mechanism.
A recent report finds that 61% of DSM diagnoses
include criteria about context [54]; however, few are
based explicitly on the kind of functional understanding
of normal responses that guides decisions in the rest of
medicine. For instance, cough clears foreign matter
from respiratory passages, so its presence motivates a
search for possible causes; cough itself is considered
abnormal only when no elicitor can be found. In psy-
chiatry, emotions sufficient in duration and intensity are
categorized as disorders irrespective of the situation.
This encourages treatment without investigating possible
causes, on the assumption that anxiety and depression
are abnormal.
The implication for psychiatric nosology is that emo-
tional states should be classified as disorders only if they
are excessive for the situation. Deciding what is exces-
sive requires knowledge about what situations normally
arouse the symptom, in conjunction with a search for
such situations. This is not a new idea; previous versions
of the DSM listed reactive emotional states separately
from endogenous conditions that arise from faulty regu-
lation mechanisms, and DSM-IV sometimes requires a
judgment based on context (for example, in Adjustment
Disorder). What is new is recognizing that emotions
serve functions in the same way that pain, cough and
fever do, and that they are regulated by mechanisms
shaped by natural selection.
There are also differences between emotions and other
defenses. Pain, cough and fever are usually aroused by
specific identifiable problems. Anxiety, anger and low
mood are aroused by situations harder to specify, and
less readily characterized as abnormal. For instance, a
man who is laid off from a job might feel anxiety about
possibly losing his home, anger about the employer’s
broken promises that may be excessive because it stirs
childhood memories, and low mood because he sees no
way to find a new job. These responses are not diseases,
but they nonetheless pose adaptive challenges that
arouse emotional responses, just as pneumonia arouses
fever and cough. Some common situations, such as
being trapped in an abusive marriage, impair social
function as drastically as pneumonia disrupts respiratory
function, so it is not surprising that they arouse substan-
tial symptoms. This does not imply that such emotions
are usually useful in the individual instance, any more
than experiencing pain is usually useful; it means only
that they are adaptive capacities shaped by selection.
Like other symptoms, emotions arise from interactions
of persons with situations. Clinical assessments under-
standably focus on trait differences among individuals;
most anxious patients are concerned about their life-
long tendency to excess anxiety, not about their reaction
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to a particular spider. However, changing a patient’s
emotional experience often requires close attention to
the current motivational structure of his or her life. This
includes the person’s goals, strategies, opportunities and
obstacles in each area. Unfortunately for research, moti-
vational structures involve idiosyncratic values and psy-
chological characteristics interacting with a lifetime of
experiences and the current situation. Clinicians intui-
tively recognize how some situations give rise to symp-
toms; anxiety is understandable in a woman whose
husband’s tennis partners have all recently left their
wives for younger women. Finding ways to code such
data and bring it into a biological framework is a chal-
lenging, ongoing project.
Recognizing aversive emotions as adaptive responses
may help challenge oversimplified conceptualizations of
psychiatric disorders. Like pain and fever, anxiety and
depression are nonspecific symptoms that can be
aroused by many different problems, so comorbidity and
heterogeneity are to be expected. Like the presence of
other defenses, the presence of an intense emotion
should set in motion a search for situational causes, as
well as for individual differences in traits. All emotions
are caused by brain changes, but only in the same
superficial sense that brain activity in the medulla
explains cough. Individual trait differences in emotional
responsiveness can arise from brain differences, but they
can also arise from differences in cognitive-affective
schemas. The complexity of person x’s situation interac-
tions frustrates attempts to generalize about causes; the
important factors differ from person to person, and
even from episode to episode in the same person.
Major challenges confront the project of framing
nosology for emotional disorders in terms of the normal
functions of emotions. For instance, the DSM has
focused on excesses of a few aversive emotions, but dis-
orders of excess and deficit should exist for every emo-
tion; this includes deficits of negative emotions, such as
anxiety, and excesses of positive emotions, such as joy.
Grouping all emotional disorders together in a category
called “Abnormalities of emotion regulation” would
make it clear that negative emotional states can be nor-
mal, and that information about context is essential to
decide whether the expression of an emotion is normal
or abnormal.
Deciding how to use information about context is an
admittedly large challenge. A simple approach would be
to code the causes for each emotional state as None-
Mild-Moderate-Severe on two axes, one indicating the
Trait Vulnerability, the other the intensity of Current
Situations likely to arouse it. Would such coding be
practical? While the difficulties would be substantial, the
history of medicine documents the value of trying to
distinguish clinically similar conditions with different
causes, even when that compromises reliability.
To illustrate, consider two cases. A community college
student, whose parents and siblings have not experi-
enced mental disorders, functioned well until manifest-
ing typical symptoms of Major Depression in the past
three months. An analysis of his motivational structure
reveals that he hates being in community college, but
feels he must continue or his girlfriend will leave him.
She is still in high school, but will soon leave town to
attend an elite university in a distant state. Codes of
Moderate on the Current Situation axis, and None on
the Trait Vulnerability axis, provide important informa-
tion for treatment planning. In contrast, another young
man with similar symptoms reports being abused by his
stepfather after his father, who suffered from depression
and alcoholism, left when he was two years old. He has
always felt isolated and inadequate, but he has a stable
job and several close friends. A diagnosis that includes
Severe Trait Vulnerability factors, and Mild Current
Situation factors, would communicate important infor-
mation about his disorder.
Syndromes that reflect system failures
Medical conditions that result from specific genetic or
infectious causes are exemplars of disease; for instance,
cystic fibrosis and pneumonia. However, many medical
syndromes are defined, not by their etiology, but by fail-
ures of functional systems that may have diverse etiolo-
gies. For instance, expressive aphasia results from
damage to Broca’s area that may have many possible
causes. The search for similar specific genetic, neuro-
physiologic or anatomic abnormalities to explain bipolar
disorder, major depression and schizophrenia has been
disappointing, at best. It must proceed; specific causes
will be found for some disorders. However, other possi-
bilities have been neglected.
Some mental disorders may, like congestive heart fail-
ure (CHF), arise from failures of functional systems at
higher levels of organization, failures that can have
many different causes. Nosological concerns for CHF
are minimal because heart failure can be measured
objectively, and the physiology is well understood. The
causes of a mental disorder may not only be multiple,
they may arise from interactions among brain circuits
and psychological mechanisms at several levels.
It is easy to see how blood sugar is stabilized by insu-
lin secretion in response to high glucose levels. Under-
standing the functions of behavioral systems is harder.
The mechanisms that regulate self-esteem, mood and
anxiety are not susceptible to exactly parallel analyses at
the cellular level because they are distributed among
brain circuits and psychological mechanisms at several
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levels. For instance, managing social status requires pro-
cessing innumerable cues in light of recalled prior infor-
mation. A demeaning comment that begins to arouse
resentment may be followed by a wink that changes the
meaning into a shared joke–unless the individual’s
brain/mind is prone to paranoia.
Psychiatric nosology is constrained by the lack a func-
tional understanding of normal behavior akin to what
physiology provides for bodily functions. Behavioral
ecology provides the closest comparable framework. It
explains behavior in terms of its functional significance
and effects on reproductive success, explanations essen-
tial in addition to those based on mechanisms [55]. For
instance, it explains foraging behavior in terms of the
costs and benefits of alternative strategies. It explains
attachment in terms of its effects on fitness of infant
and mother. This allows analysis of variations in attach-
ment patterns–ambivalent, avoidant, and secure–as
alternative strategies with costs and benefits in different
situations [56]. The field is often called “evolutionary
behavioral ecology” because such explanations are based
on how selection shapes brain and psychological
mechanisms that regulate behavior in ways that maxi-
mize Darwinian fitness [57].
Early applications of behavioral ecological are proving
useful. Eating disorders may arise from dysregulation of
systems that regulate food intake [58,59]. Syndromes
arising from failures of attachment have been studied in
detail [56]. Low self-esteem and narcissism may arise
from dysregulation of status competition behaviors
[60,61]. Mood disorders can be understood as disrup-
tions in the system that adapts individuals to situations
that vary in propitiousness [49]. Jealousy and diverse
related symptoms may arise from the mechanisms that
regulate mate competition and relationship maintenance
[62,63]. Understanding dysregulation in these systems in
behavioral ecological terms is not a substitute for under-
standing its causes in an individual, but it does offer an
approach to the understanding of normal functioning
somewhat parallel to what physiology offers to the rest
of medicine [64,65].
The findings in some mental syndromes cohere, not
because they come from a common etiology, but
because they arise from failure or dysregulation of a
functional system, or because they are responses often
associated with a common situation, such as being in an
abusive marriage. This suggests that some complaints
about the comorbidity and heterogeneity of DSM diag-
noses may arise from unrealistic expectations. There is
no reason to expect that syndromes arising from dysre-
gulated systems will have specific causes or sharp
boundaries, and no reason to expect that a brain-based
diagnostic system will ever be able to categorize them
adequately. The comorbidity, heterogeneity and blurry
boundaries of many DSM categories may accurately
reflect clinical reality.
Disorders from control system failures
Disorders are called “functional,” if they arise from
abnormal function of a system despite the lack of identi-
fiable tissue abnormalities. Some, such as essential tre-
mor, have observable clinical signs. Others, such as
tinnitus, dizziness, fatigue, headaches and chronic pain,
may have only subjective manifestations. Instead of spe-
cific cellular pathology, such disorders may be caused by
feedback dysregulation at high levels of organization.
Vicious circles resulting from positive feedback at
macro levels are responsible for many disorders. For
instance, appendicitis is initiated by inflammation that
compromises circulation at the neck of the appendix.
This decreases ability to control infection, resulting in
more infection, causing more inflammation and further
compromise of circulation, in a cycle that escalates until
the appendix bursts. On a slower time scale, osteoporo-
sis may cause pain that limits exercise and results in
additional bone loss.
Panic disorder may also result from positive feedback
[66,67]. In patients concerned about their health, slight
changes in heart rate and breathing cause fear, which
causes additional physiological arousal, which further
increases fear, in a spiral that escalates into a panic
attack. A full explanation requires understanding indivi-
dual differences in brain and cognition that make some
people vulnerable to current situations arousing anxiety
and the positive feedback cycle at the levels of cognition
and emotion [68].
Cybernetic explanations may also help to explain
other mental disorders [69]. Does dieting cause binging,
which arouses greater fear of obesity and more intense
dieting? Does depressive withdrawal from social life
cause increased depression and further withdrawal?
Does suspicion cause odd behavior, which results in
whispered gossip, causing escalating suspicion, and
increasingly odd behavior, and further whispering that
arouses more suspicion? Disorders arising from positive
feedback spirals are not likely to have disorder-specific
neurophysiological changes. Their typical characteristics
may be associated, not because they have a common
cause or because they arise from a consistent brain
abnormality, but because they are interacting aspects of
a feedback cycle.
Do some mental problems arise at the level of infor-
mation processing? Software problems can crash a com-
puter even if the hardware is normal. If a program goes
into an infinite loop or reaches a dead-end, the system
will fail, even if every chip and connection is intact. If
some mental disorders arise from analogous failures, we
need to look for biomarkers in information systems.
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The analogy of minds with computers is far from per-
fect. Software is designed by engineers who create mod-
ules with specific functions. The programs they write
have limited redundancy, so failure at any line of code
may crash the program. Brains/minds are different; they
are best understood using an entirely different metaphor
(such as “wetware”). Because they were shaped by nat-
ural selection among miniscule variations over eons of
time, their modules are less discrete, and they have myr-
iad redundant interconnections and remarkable robust-
ness. That a child can grow up to function almost
normally after early removal of an entire brain hemi-
sphere illustrates just how different brains are from
computers. Nonetheless, it is worth considering the pos-
sibility that mental pathology can arise at the level of
information processing.
Conclusions
The search for satisfactory categories for mental disor-
ders has been frustrating, at best. Hopes that DSM-III
and IV diagnoses would map well to clinical and neu-
roscience realities have been dashed by studies that
reveal a landscape charitably described as untidy. The
disappointment is like that of immigrants who expect to
find a city with streets of gold but who instead discover
a chaotic jumble of muddy ruts.
The disappointment was magnified because the dis-
crete categories of the DSM-III combined with wishes to
emulate the rest of medicine to encourage a tacit narrow
medical model that assumes disorders can be crisply
defined by their causes, and that each disorder will have
corresponding specific biomarkers. The actual model
used in the rest of medicine is broader. Diagnostic cate-
gories are based on etiology when possible, but many are
based on a physiological understanding of the normal
functions of bodily systems. This broader medical model
encourages separating symptoms that are protective
responses from problems that arouse them. It also allows
recognizing syndromes that reflect failures of functional
systems that can have many causes, and functional syn-
dromes that arise from dysregulation of otherwise intact
systems. In short, psychiatry has been hoping to find dis-
orders more discrete than many in the rest of medicine.
The difficulties are further magnified because psychia-
try lacks the framework for understanding normally
evolved functions that physiology provides for the rest
of medicine. This makes it difficult to recognize the uti-
lity of protective responses, and to recognize syndromes
that arise from failures of adaptive systems. Without the
evolutionary/functional perspective the rest of medicine
relies on to recognize syndromes, such as CHF, research
in psychiatry has tended to look for causes at the levels
of cells and molecules.
Unfortunately, describing functional systems that reg-
ulate behavior is not only in the early stages, it may also
be intrinsically difficult. Evolutionary behavioral ecology
and evolutionary approaches to psychology offer starting
points, but behavior regulation systems do not just
maintain homeostasis, they process thousands of bits of
internal and external information in the light of prior
experience, and current goals and strategies, to give rise
to emotions and behaviors that tended to maximize
reproductive success in ancestral environments. While it
is now clear that these systems are nothing like a tabula
rasa, it is increasingly obvious that they are also nothing
like the components of a machine. They are not even as
distinct as the components of other functional biological
systems. The functions and localization of the loop of
Henle, the mitral valve and glucose regulation are far
more specific than those for motivation, memory or the-
ory of mind. Despite these difficulties, opportunities
abound. Mental disorders will be fully understood only
when we can, as in the rest of medicine, understand
pathology in terms of normal functions as well as nor-
mal mechanisms.
In the meanwhile, dissatisfaction with DSM cate-
gories may be tempered by encouraging more realistic
expectations. Instead of specific diseases with specific
causes, many mental problems are somewhat heteroge-
neous overlapping syndromes that can have multiple
causes. Most are not distinct species like birds or flow-
ers. They are more like different plant communities,
each with a typical collection of species. Distinguishing
tundra from alpine meadow, arboreal forest and
Sonoran desert is useful, even though the categories
are not entirely homogenous and distinct. Many men-
tal disorders are similarly useful constructs, even if
they frustrate the craving for reified categories with
sharp boundaries defined by necessary and sufficient
conditions.
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